The Torrent Server is an integral part of the Personal Genome Machine (PGM™) System. Dimensions: 24 in (61 cm) (W) x 20 in (51 cm) (D) x 21 in (53 cm) (H).
. Killer is Dead скачать торрент и учиться науке соблазнения. Ex Machine. Ex Machine. Скачать торрент и постараться выжить.
Killer is Dead скачать торрент и учиться науке соблазнения. Ex Machine. Ex Machine. Скачать торрент и постараться выжить. Time Machine в OS X : настройка и использование. Юрий Милош. А на Airport TC можно настроить торрент что-бы автономно качал? Из машины (2014) — Ex Machina. Всё о фильме: дата. слоган, «To erase the line between man and machine is to obscure the line between men and gods». Поддержка Virtual Machine Interface. При использовании торрента для загрузки файла, трафик может значительно превышать. Directed by Alex Garland. With Alicia Vikander, Domhnall Gleeson, Oscar Isaac, Sonoya Mizuno. A young programmer is selected to participate in a .
New OS X Ransomware Ke. Ranger Infected Transmission Bit. Torrent Client Installer. On March 4, we detected that the Transmission Bit.
Torrent client installer for OS X was infected with ransomware, just a few hours after installers were initially posted. We have named this Ransomware “Ke. Ranger.” The only previous ransomware for OS X we are aware of is File. Coder, discovered by Kaspersky Lab in 2. As File. Coder was incomplete at the time of its discovery, we believe Ke. Ranger is the first fully functional ransomware seen on the OS X platform.
Attackers infected two installers of Transmission version 2. Ke. Ranger on the morning of March 4. When we identified the issue, the infected DMG files were still available for downloading from the Transmission site (hxxps: //download. Transmission- 2. 9. Transmission is an open source project. It’s possible that Transmission’s official website was compromised and the files were replaced by re- compiled malicious versions, but we can’t confirm how this infection occurred.
Figure 1 Ke. Ranger hosted in Transmission’s official website. The Ke. Ranger application was signed with a valid Mac app development certificate; therefore, it was able to bypass Apple’s Gatekeeper protection. If a user installs the infected apps, an embedded executable file is run on the system. Ke. Ranger then waits for for three days before connecting with command and control (C2) servers over the Tor anonymizer network. The malware then begins encrypting certain types of document and data files on the system. After completing the encryption process, Ke. Ranger demands that victims pay one bitcoin (about $4.
Additionally, Ke. Ranger appears to still be under active development and it seems the malware is also attempting to encrypt Time Machine backup files to prevent victims from recovering their back- up data. Palo Alto Networks reported the ransomware issue to the Transmission Project and to Apple on March 4.
Apple has since revoked the abused certificate and updated XProtect antivirus signature, and Transmission Project has removed the malicious installers from its website. Palo Alto Networks has also updated URL filtering and Threat Prevention to stop Ke. Ranger from impacting systems. Technical Analysis. The two Ke. Ranger infected Transmission installers were signed with a legitimate certificate issued by Apple. The developer listed this certificate is a Turkish company with the ID Z7. PX6. 73, which was different from the developer ID used to sign previous versions of the Transmission installer. In the code signing information, we found that these installers were generated and signed on the morning of March 4. Figure 2 Code signing information of Ke.
Ranger. The Ke. Ranger infected Transmission installers include an extra file named General. Transmission. app/Contents/Resources directory. It uses an icon that looks like a normal RTF file but is actually a Mach- O format executable file packed with UPX 3. When users click these infected apps, their bundle executable Transmission. Content/Mac. OS/Transmission will copy this General. Library/kernel_service and execute this “kernel_service” before any user interface appearing.
Figure 3 The malicious executable pretends to be an RTF document. Figure 4 Ke. Ranger executes the extra General. After unpacking the General. UPX, we determined that its main behavior is to encrypt the user’s files and hold them for ransom.
The first time it executes, Ke. Ranger will create three files “. Library directory and write the current time to “. It will then sleep for three days. Note that, in a different sample of Ke.
Ranger we discovered, the malware also sleeps for three days, but also makes requests to the C2 server every five minutes. Figure 5 Ke. Ranger sleeps for three days before fully executing. The General. rtf will collect infected Mac’s model name and UUID, upload the information to one of its C2 servers. These servers’ domains are all sub- domains of onion[.]link or onion[.]nu, two domains that host servers only accessible over the Tor network. The executable will keep trying to connect with the C2 server until it respond with two lines of encoded data. After decoding these two lines using Base. RSA public key and the second line is written to files named “README_FOR_DECRYPT.
Figure 6 Connect with C2 server and get instructions. When we were analyzing the samples, the C2 server returned the data for the README_FOR_DECRYPT. It asks victims to pay exactly one bitcoin (currently around $4. Tor network website to decrypt the files. The website will then guide victims to buy a bitcoin from somewhere else and transfer to the attacker at the address of “1.
PGAUBq. HNcw. SHYKnp. Hgz. Cr. Pkyx. Nxvsm. Eof”. Figure 7 README file ask victim to pay Bitcoin. Figure 8 Tor website to transfer bitcoin and get decryption pack. After connecting to the C2 server and retrieving an encryption key, the executable will traverse the “/Users” and “/Volumes” directories, encrypt all files under “/Users”, and encrypt all files under “/Volumes” which have certain file extensions. There are 3. 00 different extensions specified by the malware, including: Documents: .
Images: . jpg, . jpeg,Audio and video: . Archives: . zip, . Source code: . cpp, .
Database: . db, . Email: . eml. Certificate: . Figure 9 Encrypt all files under “/Users” and all specific files under “/Volumes”Ke.
Ranger statically linked an open source encryption library named mbed TLS (formerly Polar. SSL). As Ke. Ranger encrypts each file (i. Test. docx) starts by creating an encrypted version that uses the . Test. docx. encrypted.) To encrypt each file, Ke.
Ranger starts by generating a random number (RN) and encrypts the RN with the RSA key retrieved from the C2 server using the RSA algorithm. It then stores the encrypted RN at the beginning of resulting file.
Next, it will generate an Initialization Vector (IV) using the original file’s contents and store the IV inside the resulting file. After that, it will mix the RN and the IV to generate an AES encryption key. Finally, it will use this AES key to the contents of the original file and write all encrypted data to the result file. Figure 1. 0 Encrypt each file’s content by AESIn addition to this behavior, it seems like Ke.
Ranger is still under development. There are some apparent functions named “_create_tcp_socket”, “_execute_cmd” and “_encrypt_timemachine”. Some of them have been finished but are not used in current samples.
Our analysis suggests the attacker may be trying to develop backdoor functionality and encrypt Time Machine backup files as well. If these backup files are encrypted, victims would not be able to recover their damaged files using Time Machine. Figure 1. 1 Function “_encrypt_timemachine” is implemented but not used yet. Mitigations. We reported the issue to the Transmission Project and to Apple immediately after we identified it. Apple has since revoked the abused certificate, and Gatekeeper will now block the malicious installers. Apple has also updated XProtect signatures to cover the family, and the signature has been automatically updated to all Mac computers now.
As of March 5, Transmission Project has removed the malicious installers from its website. We have also updated URL filtering and Threat Prevention to stop Ke. Ranger from impacting Palo Alto Networks customers.
How to Protect Yourself. Users who have directly downloaded Transmission installer from official website after 1. PST, March 4, 2. 01. PST, March 5, 2. 01. Ke. Ranger. If the Transmission installer was downloaded earlier or downloaded from any third party websites, we also suggest users perform the following security checks. Users of older versions of Transmission do not appear to be affected as of now. We suggest users take the following steps to identify and remove Ke.
Ranger holds their files for ransom: Using either Terminal or Finder, check whether /Applications/Transmission. Contents/Resources/ General.
Volumes/Transmission/Transmission. Contents/Resources/ General.
If any of these exist, the Transmission application is infected and we suggest deleting this version of Transmission. Using “Activity Monitor” preinstalled in OS X, check whether any process named “kernel_service” is running.
If so, double check the process, choose the “Open Files and Ports” and check whether there is a file name like “/Users/< username> /Library/kernel_service” (Figure 1. If so, the process is Ke. Ranger’s main process. We suggest terminating it with “Quit - > Force Quit”. After these steps, we also recommend users check whether the files “.
Library directory. If so, you should delete them. Figure 1. 2 The malicious “kernel_service” process.
Since Apple has revoked the abused certificate and has updated XProtect signatures, if a user tries to open a known infected version of Transmission, a warning dialog will be shown that states “Transmission. You should move it to the Trash.” Or “Transmission can’t be opened. You should eject the disk image.” In any case if you see these warnings, we suggest to follow Apple’s instruction to avoid being affected.
Figure 1. 3 OS X system prevent user to open the infected installer. Acknowledgements. We greatly thank Yi Ren, Yuchen Zhou, Jack Wang, Jun Wang from Palo Alto Networks for helping to analyze Ke.
Ranger and protect our customers in a timely fashion. Thanks to Richard Wartell, Ryan Olson and Chad Berndtson from Palo Alto Networks for their assistance during the analysis and reporting. IOCs. Samples of Ransomware.
OSX. Ke. Rangerd. Transmission- 2. 9.
Transmission. 31b. General. rtfd. 7d. Transmission. 2. 9. Transmission. 60. General. rtf. Domainslclebb.